Florida Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 1

Article 6

January 1997

Just Not Fair: An Analysis of Florida's Retroactive Revocation of
Early Prison Release Cards
Jonathan W. Newlon

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jonathan W. Newlon, Just Not Fair: An Analysis of Florida's Retroactive Revocation of Early Prison
Release Cards, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 169 (1997).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss1/6

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.
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CASE COMMENTS
JUST NOT FAIR: AN ANALYSIS OF
FLORIDA'S RETROACTIVE REVOCATION
OF EARLY PRISON RELEASE CREDITS
Calamia v. Singletary,
686 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1996)*
Jonathan W. Newlon'
Petitioners are two Florida prison inmates serving sentences for
second-degree murder.' Each petitioner asserted that two Florida
statutes2 violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States
Constitution3 and the Florida Constitution,4 by retroactively revoking
petitioners' awards 5 of early prison release days designated, "provisional
credits"6 and "administrative gain-time."7 One petitioner sought a writ
of mandamus to restore his revoked awards, and the other sought a writ

* Editor's Notes: This case comment received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case
Comment Award for Spring 1997.
Prior to publication of this case comment, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
Supreme Court of Florida decision upon which the comment is based. 117 S. Ct. 1309 (1997).
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed its position on the issue, and granted the
petitioners the requested writs. 694 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1997). Although the Supreme Court of
Florida decided to reinstate the petitioners' credits, the court did so in an extremely cursory
opinion. It is our hope, therefore, that the legal analysis found in this case comment will
contribute to the molding and articulation of Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence in Florida.
** With love and gratitude, I dedicate this comment to my wife Cathy, and to my
daughters Amanda, Olivia, Alexandra, and Rebecca.
1. Calamia v. Singletary, 686 So. 2d 1337, 1338 (Fla. 1996).
2. FLA. STAT. § 944.278 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 944.277 (Supp. 1992) (repealed 1993).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall.., pass any... ex post facto
Law .... ).
4. FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10 ("No ... ex post facto law... shall be passed.").
5. In conjunction, these statutes excluded certain classes of convicts-including
murderers, like petitioners-from receiving provisional credits, and revoked from these classes
all previously awarded provisional credits and administrative gain time. See FLA. STAT. §
944.278 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 944.277 (Supp. 1992). On the date of revocation, Calamia and
Hock had accumulated 420 and 360 days of credit, respectively. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338.

6. FLA. STAT. § 944.277 (1995).
7. FLA. STAT. § 944.276 (1987) (repealed 1987); see Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338
("Because Calamia and Hock had been convicted of second-degree murder, their provisional
credits were cancelled.").
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of habeas corpus to effect his release from prison.8 Respondent,
Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, contended that the
retroactive elimination of such credits and gain time violated neither
constitution because the early release days were intended to be used by
the -Department of Corrections to alleviate prison overcrowding,9 an
administrative matter."° Respondent posited that the statutes were not
a quantifiable part of petitioners' sentences and were procedural in
nature; 1 therefore, the statutes were not subject to ex post facto
scrutiny. 2 The Supreme Court of Florida consolidated consideration of
the two petitions, 3 and HELD, that the statutes did not violate ex post
facto prohibitions because the statutes were procedural in nature 4 and
affected credits that were wholly unrelated to petitioners' sentences.'
As a general proposition, an ex post facto law is one that is passed
"after the fact." 6 A prohibition on this type of law is found expressly
in the United States Constitution, 7 but American courts have noted that
ex post facto considerations were present even before America won its
independence. From an early point in American legal history, courts
have found two major reasons to forbid ex post facto laws: prevention
of arbitrary and vindictive legislation and provision of fair warning of
8. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338. Hock sought the writ of mandamus, while Calamia
sought the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
9. See id. at 1338-39. See generally FLA. STAT. § 944.277 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 944.276
(Supp. 1992) (repealed 1993). These statutes provided for the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections to distribute provisional credits and administrative gain time when the prison
population reached 98% capacity.
10. See Calamia,686 So. 2d at 1338-39 (citing Blankenship v. Dugger, 521 So. 2d 1097,
1098-99 (Fla. 1988)). In Blankenship, the Supreme Court of Florida explicitly stated that gain
time tied to prison population was solely for the administrative convenience of the Department
of Corrections). Blankenship, 521 So. 2d at 1098-99.
I1.See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1339.
12. See id. at 1340.
13. Id. at 1338. Petitioner Hock sought from the court a writ of mandamus that would
require the Secretary of the Department of Corrections to reinstate Hock's revoked credits and
gain time. On the same facts, Hock had previously been denied a writ of habeas corpus by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Hock v. Singletary, 41 F.3d 1470, 1471 (lth Cir. 1995).
Petitioner Calamia's petition for a writ of habeas corpus had previously been denied by the
Florida Supreme Court. Calamia v. Singletary, 645 So. 2d 450, 450 (Fla. 1994). Subsequently,
the United States Supreme Court vacated denial of Calamia's petition and remanded the case
for reconsideration. Calamia v. Singletary, 514 U.S. 1124 (1995).
14. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1340.
15. Id.
16. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990).
17. U.S. CONST art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
18. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.)
386, 391 (1798) (Chase, J.)). The term "ex post facto" was in use before the American
Revolution. See id.
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the effect of laws.' 9 With these aims in mind, American courts have
molded ex post facto jurisprudence."
The United States Supreme Court furthered these objectives in
Weaver v. Graham,2 which marked Florida's introduction into the
melee of ex post facto challenges to denial of gain time.' In Weaver,
the State of Florida had enacted a statute that altered the amount of gain
time an inmate could earn for good behavior.23 This law was passed
after the petitioner's trial,24 and was retroactively applied to the
petitioner, who challenged the application as a violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause.' The petitioner in Weaver asserted that the new statute
would increase his sentence by reducing the amount of gain time he
could receive.26 The State of Florida contended, however, that the gain
time was procedural in nature because it was never technically a part of
the petitioner's sentence,27 and therefore, did not implicate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.2"
The Weaver Court flatly rejected the contention of the State."
Although the Court recognized that purely procedural laws were not
subject to ex post facto challenge, 0 the Weaver majority firmly
established that seemingly procedural laws could be subject to ex post
facto proscriptions because "the effect, not the form, of the law...
determines whether it is ex postfacto."' If the law was retroactive and
worked to petitioner's disadvantage, then the law transgressed ex post
facto proscriptions.32 Following this rationale, the Weaver Court found
that it was unnecessary for the gain time to be tied to the sentence
19. Id. at 429-30 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980); Calder,3 U.S.
(Dall.) at 389).

20. See, e.g., Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29 (noting that the goals of governmental restraint
and fair warning were intended by the Framers when the Ex Post Facto Clause was drafted).
21. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
22. See id. at 25 (presenting an ex post facto challenge to a statute that had the effect of
reducing the amount of early release time for good behavior that the petitioner could earn).
23. See id. at 25 & n.1. The newer statute reduced by 40% the amount of gain time an
inmate could earn for good conduct. See id.; see generally FLA. STAT. § 944.275 (1995).
24. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 25-27.
25. Id. at 27.
26. See id. at 27 & n.6 (implying that, although the statute was technically applied
prospectively, it reduced the amount of gain time the petitioner would have earned under the
statute effective when the crime was committed).
27. Id. at 31.

28. See id. (noting the respondent's contention that because the statute was not
retrospective, no ex post facto issue was raised).
29. See id. at 31-32.
30. See id. at 29 n.12.
31. Id. at 31.
32. See id. at 29 (citing Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937)).
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imposed." The constriction of the petitioner's opportunity to earn early
release proved that a substantial right was altered by the retroactive
application of the new law to the petitioner.34 Thus, the Court determined that the statute violated ex post facto principles.
Despite the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Weaver,
the Supreme Court of Florida subsequently heard a number of cases in
which it held that certain early release statutes could be retroactively
altered. Dugger.v. Rodrickl7 was one in a series of Supreme Court
of Florida cases upholding statutes that denied inmates convicted of
certain offenses the opportunity to receive provisional credits.38 In
Rodrick, an inmate challenged such a statute because it was enacted
after commission of his crime, and it excluded him from provisional
credit eligibility.39 The inmate contended that the statute was an
unconstitutional ex post facto law, as defined by the Weaver Court.4"
The court rejected this contention on two alternative grounds.41
First, the court concluded that provisional credits were distinguishable
from the conduct-related gain time addressed in Weaver.42 Conductrelated gain time, according to the Rodrick court, was quantifiable
because it depended solely on an inmate's good behavior, which is
controlled exclusively by the inmate.43 Provisional credits, however,
were not reasonably expected by an inmate because they were tied to
highly variable prison population levels." Second, the court determined

33. Id. at 32.
34. Id. at 35-36. Although the newer statutory scheme increased the overall amount of
gain time an inmate could receive, it allowed the Department of Corrections significantly more
discretion in awarding gain time than it possessed under the older statute. See id. at 35 & n.19.
35. Id. at 36.
36. See, e.g., Blankenship, 521 So. 2d at 1099 (differentiating between "good time" gain
time as addressed in Weaver and gain time awarded as a result of prison overcrowding, and
stating that "good time" gain time automatically accrues to inmates if they are well behaved,
while administrative gain time is never guaranteed to accrue to inmates).
37. 584 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1991).
38. See, e.g., Blankenship, 521 So. 2d at 1099. In several cases heard approximately ten
years after the Supreme Court's decision in Weaver, the Florida Supreme Court made efforts to
distinguish Weaver, and to find as baseless ex post facto challenges to legislative denial of
various types of early release credits. See, e.g., id. (finding a distinction of legal significance
between the automatically accruing gain time in Weaver and the contingent gain time being dealt
with by the court).
39. Rodrick, 584 So. 2d at 2.
40. See id. at 4 (noting that respondent attempted to liken provisional credits to the "good
time" gain time addressed by the Weaver Court).
41. See id. at 3-4.
42. Id. at 3 (quoting Blankenship, 521 So. 2d at 1099).
43. See id. at 4.
44. Id. The court noted that the basic difference between the two types of gain time was

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss1/6

4

Newlon: Just Not Fair: An Analysis of Florida's Retroactive Revocation of
CASE COMMENT

that provisional credits were instituted only to assist the Department of
Corrections in maintaining legal prison population levels.'5 The statutes
were, therefore, procedural in nature46 and were not subject to an ex
post facto challenge.47
Shortly after Rodrick, the United States Supreme Court revisited the
ex post facto issue in California Department of Corrections v. Morales.4" The Morales Court approved a California statutory amendment49 that provided for a parole board to hold hearings to evaluate
certain classes of prisoners" for parole suitability." The board was
granted discretion in determining whether a prisoner within an affected
class would be suitable for parole in subsequent years. 2 On a finding
that the prisoner had a low likelihood of future parole suitability, the
board could defer the next parole hearing for up to three years.53 The
board found that the respondent, a prisoner who belonged to an affected
class,54 would not likely be suitable for parole in subsequent years, and
accordingly deferred his next suitability hearing for the three-year
maximum period." The respondent objected, asserting an ex post facto
violation because the statute in effect at the time of his crime guaranteed
annual suitability hearings.56
In the course of upholding the statute, the Morales Court clarified the
standard for ex post facto interpretation." Specifically, the Court stated
that ex post facto classification was limited to those laws that retroactively either alter the definition of a crime or increase the penalty for

the connection--or lack thereof-to the sentence. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 297 (1977)). The court stated that a law,
even if it works to the detriment of a prisoner, is not ex post facto if it is found to be strictly
procedural in nature. Id.
48. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
50. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2) allowed the deferral of hearings for prisoners who had been
convicted of more than one unlawful killing. Morales, 514 U.S. at 503.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. id. Respondent was twice convicted of murder in California; the second murder took
place while respondent was out on parole for the first murder. Id.
55. See id. (stating that the board determined that respondent would not be suitable for
parole within the subsequent two years).
56. See id. (citing 1977 Cal. Stat. 165, § 46).
57. Id. at 504 (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990)). In Collins, the
United States Supreme Court tried to remedy any confusion surrounding ex post factc
interpretation by relegating the ex post facto definition to that which was intended at the tim(
of the framing of the Constitution. Collins, 497 U.S. at 41-43.
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criminal action.58 The Court immediately concluded that the statute in
question was retroactive, but that it did not alter the definition of the
crime for which respondent was incarcerated.59
The more involved inquiry for the Morales Court was whether the
newer statute increased the punishment for the criminal acts of the
respondent.' In its analysis, the Court stated that the constitutionality
of the statute rested on whether the statute produced a sufficient risk of
increasing the penalty attached to a crime.6 To assess the sufficiency
of the risk, the Morales Court considered two variables: the likelihood
that the respondent would be found suitable for release, and the
likelihood that the actual term of confinement would be affected for any
prisoner whose hearing was deferred.62
The Court found that there was little chance that the actual prison
time for any convict would be affected by the amendment. 63 To support
this finding, the Court considered statistical data and determined that
the respondent belonged to a class of convicts for whom parole
suitability was highly unlikely.65 In addition, the Court looked at the
heavy evidentiary burden required for the board to defer a hearing and
at the ability of convicts to seek expedited hearings during deferral
periods.66 In effect, the amendment took away nothing from the
respondent. 67 He was unlikely to be suitable for release, but upon
becoming suitable, he would not be denied a forum in which to plead

58. Morales, 514 U.S. at 504.
59. See id. at 505 (stating that the only question before the Court was whether the

aaendment increased the punishment attached to the respondent's crime).
60. See id. at 508-13. The Court dedicated approximately two lines of its opinion to
dispensing with the possibility that the amendment changed the definition of a crime, but
d, dicated several pages of its opinion to determining whether the amendment increased

pi inishment for a crime. See id.
61. Id. at 509 (citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925)). The Beazell Court stated
it the question of what legislative action was sufficient to trigger the Ex Post Facto Clause
N is a matter of degree. Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171.
62. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 511-13 (analyzing the effect of the statute on respondent and
.4 ivicts similarly situated to respondent).
63. See id. at 512.
64. See id. (relying on California Supreme Court statistics that stated that 90% of all
tates are found unsuitable for parole at their initial, and 85% are found unsuitable at
,usequent hearings).
65. Id. at 510-11.
66. See id. at 512 (noting that the parole board must make a full hearing and review of
I i elevant facts and state bases for its findings).
67. See id. at 512-13 (stating that the hearings are likely to be fruitless, even without
f(rrals; that administrative appeal processes are farreaching; and that expedited hearings can
n we all possibility of harm due to deferral).
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his case.6" Therefore, the degree of risk of increased punishment was
insufficient to render the amendment an ex post facto law.6 9
The instant court briefly discussed Morales,0 but relied on its own
precedent to classify as procedural the revocation of provisional credits
and administrative gain time.7' The instant court also stated that the
early release days were in no way related to the crimes committed by
the petitioners. 2 Cursory application of the Morales rule did not result
in a finding of an ex post facto violation because the court decided that
the penalties for the petitioners' crimes were not increased.73 Indeed,
the instant court concluded that the petitioners' penalties were wholly
unaffected.74
The dissent, however, contended that the Ex Post Facto Clause had
been violated. In its analysis, the dissent gave credence to the Weaver
rationale that the seemingly procedural form of the statutes did not free
the statutes from scrutiny.76 Because the dissent could discern no
difference between administrative and conduct-related--or incentive-gain time,77 it was compelled to examine the statutes in light of
Weaver and Morales.7' Thus, it found the statutes unconstitutional as
applied to petitioners.79
Both the majority 0 and the dissent,8 ' however, realized that a
broader issue of law and order underlay the conflict in the instant case.
Vhile the divergent outcomes of the two analyses rested on terms like
"procedure," "substance," and "sufficient risks,"8 2 both the majority and
the dissent examined the greater question of societal justice. 3 The
court addressed this issue in reference to an earlier case, in which the
same statutes challenged in the instant case were upheld because, among

68. See id. at 513.
69. Id. at 514.
70. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1340.
71. See id. at 1338-39. The instant court cited to a litany of Florida Supreme Court cases
that supported its proposition that provisional credits and administrative gain time are procedural
in nature. See id.; see, e.g., Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1994).
72. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1340.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1341 (Harding, J., dissenting).

76. Id. at 1344 (Harding, J., dissenting) (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. (Harding, J.,
dissenting).
See id. at 1342-44 (Harding, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 1345 (Harding, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1339 (quoting Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500, 501-02 (Fla. 1994)).
See id. at 1342 (Harding, J., dissenting).
See generally id. at 1337-45.
See id. at 1339; id. at 1342 (Harding, J., dissenting).
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other reasons, the State had a strong interest in protecting citizens from
dangerous criminals.84 The desire of the legislature to keep certain
classes of offenders from obtaining early release was, therefore, a crucial
issue for the instant court to consider."
By denying the petitions, the instant court implicitly promoted this
legislative goal.86 Thus, the court maintained its historical position of
allowing the State to cancel early release credits at will.8 7 Further, the
instant court solidified a process by which the legislature could enact
laws that retroactively work to the detriment of criminal offenders. 8
Under the rule set forth by the instant court,89 all criminal actors are
subject to retroactive legislation because, to retroactively revoke rights,
the legislature needs only to classify the legal change as procedural,'
or to revoke rights that vest only upon the occurrence of a highly
speculative variable. 9 According to the instant court, such legislative
action would not violate the guidelines set forth in Morales.92
The instant court fit the revocation of early release credits into the
class of statutory changes that do not violate ex post facto principles.93
In so doing, the instant court granted considerable deference to its own
precedent.94 The court explicitly followed Rodrick by labeling the
contested statutes procedural,95 but failed to analyze the case in light
of the principles articulated in recent years by the United States
Supreme Court.96 Specifically, the analysis of the instant court fell short
in its finding that the challenged statutes were strictly procedural.97

84. See id. at 1339-40 (citing Griffin, 638 So. 2d at 501-02).
85. See id. In previous cases dealing with ex post facto challenges to gain time
restrictions, the Supreme Court of Florida has recognized and approved the desire of the
legislature to keep certain offenders away from society. See, e.g., Griffin, 638 So. 2d at 501-02.
86. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338; see also supra note 5 (stating that petitioners were
denied a number of early release credits).
87. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
88. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1340 (stating that a law's disconnection with criminal
penalties and classification as procedural will exempt such law from ex post facto proscriptions).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1339.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1340 (stating that the Morales holding supports the precedent upon which
the instant court relied).
93. See id. (stating the position that provisional credits and administrative gain time are
procedural in nature and are not vulnerable to ex post facto attack).
94. See id. at 1338.
95. Id. at 1339.
96. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 510-13; see also Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31-35 (recognizing that
laws called procedural do not always leave substance untouched and treating the laws according
to their effect).
97. Compare Rodrick, 584 So. 2d at 4 with Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n.12 (illustrating the
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Such classification of the statutes resulted from the court's failure to
apply the ex post facto determinants pronounced by the Supreme Court
in Weaver and Morales.
The instant court failed to apply the reasoning from Weaver to
determine whether the statutes at issue were appropriately considered
procedural." The finding of the court that the statutes were disconnected from petitioners' sentences, and were therefore procedural, is
irreconcilable with Weaver.9 9 Under Weaver, it is immaterial whether
the statutory alteration is technically a part of the sentence; 1 ° the
"effect, not the form, of the law" determines its characterization. 0'
The effect on petitioners in the instant case is the loss of over two years
of early release credits."2 Thus, consideration of the Weaver rationale
may refute the instant court's classification of the laws as procedural.'0 3 If the statutes lose that shield, they may be ex post facto according to the Weaver rationale;" indeed, the dissent contends exactly that
point."'
Alternatively, the court could have utilized the process described in
Morales to determine whether the statutes were ex post facto.'m The
instant court could have found that the statutes at issue created a
sufficient risk of increasing the punishment attached to petitioners'
crimes. The high likelihood of petitioners' receipt of benefits under the
prior statutory scheme is evidenced by the fact that petitioners had
already been awarded provisional credits and administrative gain
time. 7 Undeniably, petitioners will spend more time in prison if the
difference in depth of analysis of classification of statutes as strictly procedural).
98. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 & n.12.
99. See id. at 32 (stating explicitly that ex post facto principles will apply even if a statute
alters punitive measures outside the sentence).
100. See id.
101. Id. at 31; see supra note 31.
102. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338; see supra note 5.
103. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1344 (Harding, J., dissenting) (contending that, under
Weaver, a seemingly procedural law can be ex post facto if it affects a substantial right, and
finding that provisional credits affect the substantive right of being freed from prison).
104. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36. If the petitioners' loss of early release credits is found
to be a burden, then the punishment is likely more onerous under the new statute than under the
old, thereby violating the rule set forth in Weaver. See id.
105. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1344 (Harding, J., dissenting) (using the language from
Weaver to support its finding of an ex post facto violation).
106. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 510-13 (applying a two-part test to determine whether the
statutory amendment presents a sufficient risk of increasing criminal punishment).
107. Compare Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338 with Morales, 514 U.S. at 512. Respondent in
Morales was determined to be a member of a class for whom release on parole is highly
unlikely, but petitioners in the instant case, evidenced by their amassing of a combined total of
780 days of credit, exhibited a high likelihood of receiving provisional credits.
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new statutes are applied to them. 8 Days of liberty are taken away,
and, according to the instant court, petitioners have no redress."°9 The
instant court could have found that an application of Morales rendered
the Florida statutes unconstitutional."0
The instant court's reliance upon its own precedent and its failure to
perform a deep analysis of the question before it"' have clouded the
definition attached to the Ex Post Facto Clause. Not only did the court
create a morass of difficulties through which Florida's lower courts must
navigate, but it also afforded the legislature great latitude in passing
retroactive laws."2 Although the goals of the legislature may be seen
as laudable by laypersons and legal authorities alike,"' close scrutiny
reveals the possibility of flaws in the process by which the court
permitted accomplishment of those goals." 4 Fortunately, the United
States Supreme Court recently has provided guidance for Florida's ex
post facto jurisprudence," 5 and, the Supreme Court of Florida, if
successful, will establish a rationale that strikes a satisfactory balance
between society's need for justice and the criminal's need for fairness.

108. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1343 (Harding, J., dissenting); see supra note 5.
109. See Calamia,686 So. 2d at 1341 (holding that provisional credits and administrative
gain time could be taken away by the legislature and denying relief to petitioners).
110. See supra note 106 (describing the Morales test by which the ex post facto challenge
was decided).
111. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1340 (stating abruptly that provisional credits were

unrelated to the penalties for petitioners' crimes and were, therefore, procedural in nature).
112. See id. at 1339-40 (reiterating Rodrick's emphasis on procedure, and holding that a
procedural law, creating a benefit based on a highly contingent occurrence, is not subject to ex
post facto proscriptions).
113. See id. at 1339 (citing Griffln, 638 So. 2d at 501-02) (concluding that the state has an
interest in protecting society from dangerous felons); see also id. at 1341 (Harding, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with the goals of the legislature).
114. See supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
115. See Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997).
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